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SOCIAL SECURITY
Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668
Adamson brought individual and class claims against the Secretary
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Secretary). The
individual claim was an appeal of the Secretary's denial of social security
disability benefits despite reports from Adamson's treating physician
supporting the claim. Finding Adamson totally disabled, the district
court reversed and imposed sanctions upon the Secretary pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 of the cost for Adamson's attorney's fees in the previous action. Adamson also sought certification of a class action, alleging
that the Secretary had an illegal policy of nonacquiescence to the law of
the Tenth Circuit concerning the weight to be given reports of treating
physicians. The district court declined to certify the proposed class
action.
Whether imposing monetary sanctions against the Secretary under
Rule 11 violated the federal government's sovereign immunity is an issue of first impression.
The Tenth Circuit found that the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2412, expressly waives immunity against attorney fee awards.
An award of Rule 11 sanctions involves two steps: first the district court
must find that a pleading violated Rule 11, then the court imposes an
appropriate sanction. The Tenth Circuit applies an abuse-of-discretion
standard on all Rule 11 issues. The court held that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by concluding that the agency's ruling was so
lacking in evidentiary support that the Secretary should have conceded
the merits of Adamson's complaint. Because the record was filled with
overwhelming evidence of Adamson's disability, the Secretary could not
have believed its position was well-grounded in fact, as Rule 11 requires.
Adamson also argues that the district court erred in denying class
certifications; and the Secretary's policy of disregarding Tenth Circuit
rulings on the proper weight to be given treating physicians' reports violated the Social Security Act, the class members' due process rights, and
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The court held that
the district court did apply an improper standard by placing upon the
class a burden that the rule does not authorize, i.e., common question
did not predominate.
The court affirmed the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, vacated the
denial of class certification, and remanded to the district court to consider a new class certification.
Bernal v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 297
Plaintiff brought this action after his application for Social Security
disability benefits and supplemental security income was denied. The
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district court affirmed the decision of the administrative agency and this
appeal ensued. There is a five-step process used in evaluating disability
claims. In this case, the administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that
plaintiff's impairments did not meet or equal those set forth in the Social Security Act at the third stage of the evaluation procedure. The ALJ
then proceeded to the fourth stage of the process and determined that
plaintiff was not prevented from engaging in his prior work as a security
guard and that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff argued that medical evidence showed he was
in fact disabled. The Tenth Circuit felt that the treating physician's report was brief, conclusory, and without foundation and that the ALJ's
decision to reject that report was supported by substantial evidence in
the record. Furthermore, the fact that the case review and RFC were
completed without the assistance of a mental health professional was not
prejudicial to the plaintiff since the ALJ's decision was amply supported
by the medical reports and records. Affirmed.
Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125
Appellee Huston, who gave up farming as a result of a back injury,
applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits. Despite nonmedical evidence that Huston suffered pain, the administrative law
judge (ALJ) found that Huston retained functional capacity for light
work. The district court reversed, finding that the record established
substantial evidence of disability.
The Tenth Circuit found that the ALJ's opinion ignored the fact
that Huston established the existence of a medically determinable back
impairment that can cause pain. Thus, the court held that a finding of
no disability cannot be made without a full evaluation of all subjective
and objective evidence of pain. The court stated that the district court
usurped the ALJ's function by reweighing the evidence and making, in
effect, its own determination. Reversed and remanded.
Eggleston v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 1244
Plaintiff suffered injuries to his back and was treated with surgery.
Subsequently, he applied for disability benefits. His claim was denied at
every step in the administrative process. On appeal to the district court,
the case was remanded to the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
Again, the claim was denied by an administrative law judge (ALJ). The
district court affirmed the denial. Plaintiff appealed to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, alleging that the ALJ erred in determining that plaintiff's injuries were not gevere enough to merit an award and that plaintiff
retains capacity to do light work.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
the case to the district court. The court held the ALJ's findings of no
severe impairment were supported by evidence of inconsistencies in
plaintiff's treating physician's report and plaintiff's testimony. The
ALJ's finding that plaintiff was capable of doing light work was sup-
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ported by the evidence. However, the ALJ's finding of no disability
based on a determination of functional literacy was not supported by the
evidence. The ALJ erroneously presumed that plaintiff's mere holding
of certain jobs in the past provided, contrary to his testimony, he must
be literate.
Doughty v. Bowen, 839 F.2d 644
This was a case of first impression in the Tenth Circuit. The issue is
whether a district court has sufficiently broad remedial powers to direct
payments of interim benefits when the individual has never been certified as disabled. This court agreed with the Fourth Circuit in concluding that interim benefits are similar to mandatory deadlines, and held
that a district court could not use its remedial powers to order interim
benefits when Congress has not so provided. If a district court were
allowed to order interim benefits payments in the initial denial of benefits cases, it would be doing something Congress has considered and not
provided for.
Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 802
The Social Security Administration (SSA) and the Oklahoma Disability Determination Services denied plaintiff's application for disability
benefits initiallly and upon reconsideration. Plaintiff obtained a de novo
hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who concluded plaintiff was not disabled within the meaninig of the Social Security Act. The
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma affirmed. The
Tenth Circuit also affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit held a claimant has the burden of proving a disability preventing him from engaging in his prior work under the SSA.
Proof of such shifts the burden to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to show by substantial evidence that the claimant can perform
other light or sedentary work activity and that these jobs exist in the
national economy. Use of medical-vocational guidelines (grids), which
take into consideration a claimant's ability to do light work, his age, education and work experience, may be used to determine if such other jobs
exist. Where the claimant's injuries cause limitations to more than
merely his ability to exert physical strength, the grids should be used
only as a guideline. Since the ALJ determined claimant's credibility was
doubtful and that his injuries did not extend beyond limiting his ability
to exert physical strength, the ALJ properly used the grids to determine
that claimant could perform other work. Therefore, claimant was not
disabled within the meaninig of the Social Security Act.
Reyes v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 242
Petitioner applied for disability benefits under the Social Security
Act. Her application was denied. She appealed to the district court,
which remanded the case to the Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
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ices (Secretary). On remand, an Administrative law judge (ALJ) found
that petitioner was disabled. The Appeals Council, acting for the Secretary, reversed. Petitioner appealed the district court, which affirmed the
Appeals Council's denial of benefits. Petitioner appealed to the Tenth
Circuit asserting that the Appeals Council lacked authority to review the
ALJ's decision and that the Appeals Council's decision to reverse was
not supported by substantial evidence.
The Tenth Circuit held that while the Secretary has the authority to
review and alter any decision of an ALJ, the Secretary's ultimate decision
must be supported by substantial evidence. To qualify as being supported by substantial evidence, the decision must include substantial
consideration of the treating physician's opinion. This opinion is to be
given greater weight than an examining physician's opinion. If, however, the Secretary rejects the treating physician's or the ALJ's opinion,
the Secretary must fully articulate legitimate reasons for such. Because
the Secretary has improperly given greater consideration to the examining physician's opinion over that of the treating physician, and because
the Secretary has failed to give legitimate reasons for such, the decision
to deny benefits is reversed.
Descheenie v. Bowen, 850 F.2d 624
Claimant unsuccessfully applied for Social Security benefits in 1971
and again in 1981. After a hearing before an ALJ, she was awarded benefits on both applications. The Social Security Administration's Appeals
Council (Council) opened reconsideration of the award of benefits on
the 1971 application, on grounds that the denial became final before the
1981 ALJ hearing. The record included memoranda asserting that
claimant had received written notice of the denial of the first application,
but the notice itself was not included in the file. The Council reversed
the award of the 1971 benefits. The district court reversed that denial.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding the absence of actual evidence of written notice denying the Social Security claim negates the
finality of the denial. The internal memoranda asserting that written notice of denial was given to Descheenie was presumptively unreliable
hearsay. The court reiterated that a decision not supported by substantial evidence must be reversed.
Everhart v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 1532
Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, filed
this action challenging the netting methodology employed under the
Social Security Act (SSA). The SSA offsets any overpayments against
any underpayments to arrive at a single net amount of either a net overpayment or underpayment. The parties stipulated that the netting regulations had been applied to the named plaintiffs and filed cross motions
for summary judgment. Upon hearing those motions, the district court
held that the regulations contravene the waiver of recoupment provisions by denying recipients notice and a hearing on the issue of waiver
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of recovery of overpayment. The district court remanded the plaintiffs'
claims to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) to recalculate their overpayments and underpayments without utilizing the
netting methodology and to accord the plaintiffs their procedural rights.
The Secretary was enjoined from applying the netting methodology to
all other beneficiaries under Title II or Title XVI of the Social Security
Act in Colorado. The statewide injunctive relief was stayed pending the
appeal. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
The Tenth Circuit held that the Secretary had exceeded his statutory authority in implementing the netting regulations. The netting
methodology disregarded the differential treatment accorded underpayments and the overpayments. Mandatory statutory provisions dictate
that administrative convenience cannot be countenanced when the netting regulations contravene the plain language of the statute.
The statewide injunction granted by the district court was tantamount to a grant of classwide relief. Absent a class certification, the
lower court should not have treated the suit as a class action by granting
statewide injunctive relief but rather should have tailored its injunction
to affect only those persons over whom it had power.

